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PUTTING "PROTECTION" BACK IN THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE: LESSONS FROM NINETEENTH
CENTURY WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS'
UNDERSTANDINGS OF EQUALITY
by LUCINDA M. FINLEY"
INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1998, I had the invaluable opportunity to dialogue across the
centuries with nineteenth century women's rights activists about the meaning of
and vision for gender equality. I gathered in Seneca Falls, New York as one of a
group of sixty distinguished women invited to celebrate and learn from the 150th
anniversary of the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments adopted at the first U.S.
Women's Rights Convention held in Seneca Falls. My 1998 group was convened
as part of a series of events called Forum '98, organized by the Susan B. Anthony
Center at the University of Rochester, and Hobart and William Smith Colleges. The
delegates of Forum '98 were convened to "assess... women's accomplishments
since 1848 and craft.., an agenda to serve as a modem framework for continuing
the work started by the women at the 1848 convention."' Our charge included
renewing the spirit of the landmark 1848 Declaration, reaffirming its principles,
and drafting a Declaration of Sentiments for the twenty-first century to chart the
course that was still necessary to continue progress towards achieving meaningful
full equality for women.2
In order to accomplish this charge, we had to ponder and engage with the
words and principles of the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments. We had to consider the
1848 Declaration not simply as an historical artifact, but as a document with a
conception of human rights and equality, and an assessment of the causes of and
prescriptions for eradicating gender inequality, that still provided relevant
contemporary insights.
Before delving into our "modest" task of assessing the achievements of
women's equal rights advocacy over the preceding 150 years and fashioning
principles and an agenda for achieving full equality in the twenty-first century, we
went as a group to visit the Women's Rights National Park in Seneca Falls. On the
site of the Methodist meeting house where the 1848 delegates convened, the words

* Frank Raichle Professor of Law, State University of Buffalo School of Law. I presented
previous drafts of this article at the Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop on Comparative Concepts of
Equality, Cornell Law School, and at a Barry Law School Symposium on the history and future of civil
rights law. I thank participants at those conferences, as well as at this Symposium, for helpful

comments; I also owe a debt ofintellectual gratitude to my sister participants in Forum '98. as well as to
Nan Johnson and Sheila Bennett, the organizers of that important event to mark the sesquicentennial of
the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention.
1. Taking Action for Women in the 21' Century in FORUM '98 at 2 (S.Besaw, N. Johnson & G.

Porter eds., 1998) (Official pamphlet of Forum '98 on file with TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS
LAW REVIEW).

2. Id. at2, 8.
[4291
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of the 1848 Declaration are now inscribed on a granite wall. When we arrived at
this solemn and inspirational monument, we saw a tow-headed toddler tracing the
words with her hand, as her parents told her that because women who lived long
ago had fought for the changes called for in these words, she could now do
anything and grow up to be anything she wanted. This moment crystallized a
complex shock of recognition as we read the words with the perspective of 150
years. The struggles enunciated in the 1848 words felt contemporary and
recognizable to us. We were awestruck by how radical the sentiments were for their
times,3 and we were inspired both by the radicalism and by the knowledge of how
much had been accomplished to address many of the grievances and blatant
inequalities. But we were simultaneously sobered by the realization that we still
shared many barriers to full equality for women with our nineteenth century sisters.
For example, while the Declaration's call for women to be allowed to exercise
their "inalienable right to the elective franchise" has been achieved, its complaint
that men have compelled women "to submit to laws, in the formation of which she
had no voice" still has contemporary resonance. 4 Although women have the right
to vote, too few women can afford to run for or achieve political office, especially
on the federal level, so largely male legislatures continue to adopt policies that
greatly impact women's bodily and sexual autonomy, family relationships, and
economic security with little regard for their gender equality implications. The
photograph that recently ran in the nation's newspapers of a row of grim faced
white men surrounding the male president as he signed into law a ban on
physicians performing a type of abortion, even when the doctor deemed the
5
procedure necessary to protect a woman's health, is one notable recent example.
While the 1848 grievance that the law condoned a husband's power "to
administer chastisement" to his wife6 is no longer true as a matter of official legal
policy, the legal remedies and social support available to battered women remain
inadequate, often constraining women to stay in violent relationships just as in the

3. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, one of the organizers of the 1848 Convention, writes in her
autobiography of the derision and outrage heaped upon her and other signatories to the 1848 Declaration
of Sentiments. She writes, "[s]o pronounced was the popular voice against us in the parlor, press and
pulpit that most of the ladies who had attended the convention and signed the declaration, one by one,
withdrew their names and influence and joined our persecutors." ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, EIGHTY
YEARS AND MORE: REMINISCENCES 1815-1897 149 (Northeastern Univ. Press paperback edition
1993)[hereinafter STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS].
4. THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN FEMINISM: THE SENECA FALLS CONVENTION OF 1848 85-89

(Virginia Bernhard & Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, eds., 1995) [hereinafter THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN
FEMINISM].

5. The President was signing into law the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. §
1531. Syndicated columnist Ellen Goodman wrote a widely reprinted op-ed article commenting on the
photographs and decrying this bill signing as "an all male chorus line of legislators ... making laws
governing something they will never have: a womb .... This is simply a mistrust of women as moral
decision makers." Ellen Goodman, Out of the Pictureon Abortion Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2003,
at AI9.
6. The 1848 Declaration of Sentiments states: "In the covenant of marriage, she is compelled to
promise obedience to her husband, he becoming to all intents and purposes, her master - the law giving
him power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement." THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN
FEMINISM, supra note 4, at 86-87.
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days of legally condoned domestic violence. While the divorce laws on their face
no longer rest "upon the false supposition of the supremacy of man," 7 in their
administration they still significantly economically and socially disadvantage many
women, especially homemakers. The 1848 Declaration's complaint that the male
has "monopolized nearly all the profitable employments, ' 8 though greatly reduced
and no longer official legal policy, remains a problem manifested in an enduring
wage gap between men and women and in the phenomenon known as "the glass
ceiling." Women's position in many churches is still subordinate, and several
major world faiths continue "claiming Apostolic authority for [women's] exclusion
from the ministry and.. . from any public participation in the affairs of the
Church."9 "Public sentiment" still sometimes prescribes a "different code of
morals for men and women,"' 0 under which men who abandon or fail to support
their offspring are ignored, while women who do so are jailed or scorned, and
women who become pregnant out of wedlock are still fired from jobs or blamed for
many societal ills, while the male role in the woman's condition is rendered
invisible.
Yet another insight from our dialogue across the centuries was the recognition
that male power holders in the nineteenth century legal system declared many of
women's grievances to be beyond the purview of a formalistic notion of legal
equality, and the same stunted vision of legal equality can still impede legislation
or legal action to better achieve substantive gender equality." As I reflected on
how the concept of formal legal equality so often seems to function as a barrier to
achieving a more meaningful substantive social, economic, and political equality, I
realized that we may have more to learn from the 1848 Seneca Falls convention
participants than just an appreciation of shared struggles.
1.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY MOVEMENT FOR WOMEN'S
RIGHTS FOR CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE

The women's rights activists of the nineteenth century were actively engaged
7. The Declaration proclaims that men have "so framed the laws of divorce, as to what shall be the
proper causes of divorce, and in cases of separation, to whom the guardianship of the children shall be
given, as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of women - the law, in all cases, going upon a false
supposition ofthe supremacy ofman, and giving all power into his hands." Id. at 87.
8. Id.

9. Id.
10. Id. The Declaration states that men have "created a false public sentiment by giving to the
world a different code of morals for men and women, by which moral delinquencies which exclude
women from society, are not only tolerated, but deemed of little account in man." Id.
11. For example, when Cady Stanton and other women's rights activists lobbied for marriage and
divorce law reform, some male legislators and other influential male political actors denied that these
laws were proper areas of concern for women's rights, since the laws applied equally to men and
women. STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS, supra note 3, at 218-19. This formalistic reasoning is echoed in the

Supreme Court's rationale, in the late twentieth century, for concluding that denial of benefits to
pregnant women posed no issue of sex-based inequality under the Fourteenth Amendment, because the
law applied equally to all non-pregnant women and men. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97
(1974).
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in the societal debates about the meaning and implications of principles of human
rights, equal citizenship, and the federal government's obligation to provide equal
protection of human rights that played a crucial formative role in the wording,
intent, and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. We can learn a great deal about
the understood meanings of terms in the Fourteenth Amendment by contemplating
the ways in which Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and other nineteenth
century women's rights activists framed issues of gender equality. They initially
assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment, with its recognition in Section One of the
"citizenship" of all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and with its
edict that no state shall deny the "privileges and immunities" of citizenship, nor
shall deny the "equal protection of the laws," 2 would apply to women and would
form the basis for redressing many of the grievances about women's inequality
spelled out in the 1848 Declaration. Although the men in Congress who had been
their abolitionist allies enraged Stanton and Anthony by adding the word "male" to
Section two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 and by repeatedly emphasizing during
the congressional debates that the amendment would not require sex equality,' 4 the
women's rights activists believed that once it became understood that the
constitutional guarantees of equality to all citizens did extend to women, the equal
human rights vision of the amendment would usefully apply to help redress the
particular reasons for women's social and legal subordination. In other words, the
problem that Stanton and other women's rights activists had with the Fourteenth
Amendment was not with the meaning of the terms "privileges and immunities of
citizenship" and "equal protection of the laws"-they saw these concepts as
sufficiently encompassing their vision of equal human rights for women. Their
problem was with the failure to extend the principles embodied in these terms to
women. Consequently, it is useful for understanding the Fourteenth Amendment,
and for gaining an appreciation of how its contemporary meanings could be made
more faithful to the broad human rights vision of its founders, to consider the
experiences and understandings of its founding mothers as well as its founding
fathers.
The "neglected stories" of the grievances of the nineteenth century women's
rights activists, as expressed in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments and other
documents and speeches, are just as relevant and important to enrich our
understanding of the meaning and potential of the Fourteenth Amendment as the
"neglected stories" of slaves and anti-slavery activists, which have been so
eloquently recounted and applied to contemporary Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence by Peggy Cooper Davis.' 5 If we take seriously the historical lessons
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. This section addressed how to determine the number of representatives to Congress from each
state, and in order to ensure that the secessionist states would comply with Reconstruction and extend
the franchise to black men, provided that a state's representation would be reduced if the right to vote
was "denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state" over the age of 21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
2.
14. STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS, supra note 3, at 242-44; Ward Farnsworth, Women Under
Reconstruction:The CongressionalUnderstanding,94 NW. U. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (2000).
12.

15.

See PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 5

(1997) (arguing that the country's commitment to family freedom is motivated by the political discourse
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of the gender equality vision of the nineteenth century founding mothers, they teach
us that the formalistic "equal treatment" model of gender equality that pervades
contemporary Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence is not only woefully
insufficient to appreciate and redress causes of gender inequality, but is also
historically impoverished.
I am not making a call for or endorsement of the method of constitutional
interpretation known as originalism-at least not the stultified form of originalism
espoused by the majority in the reviled decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford,16 which
advocated adhering to the practices of the slaveholding founding fathers rather than
the meaning of their expressed ideals and principles. 7 After all, the clearly
expressed intent of the Reconstruction Congress that women should be excluded
from the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees stands as a forceful repudiation of a
form of originalism that looks only to expressed intentions rather than to the ideals
and principles embodied in the text. 8 In asserting that nineteenth century women's
rights activists' understandings of the meaning of "citizenship," "privileges and
immunities," and "equal protection," should be relevant to contemporary
interpretation of these terms used in the Fourteenth Amendment, I am calling for a
method of interpretation that might more appropriately be called "historically
and stories of enslaved families that have enriched family rights jurisprudence); Peggy Cooper Davis,
Neglected Stories and the Sweet Mystery of Liberty, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 769, 770-76
(2004) (discussing the neglected stories of slavery and its relationship to the current debate surrounding
homosexual marriage).
16. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 412 (1857).
17. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Story of Dred Scott: Originalism's Forgotten Past, in
Constitutional LAW STORIES 151 (Michael Dorf, ed., 2004) (arguing that Justice "Taney maintained that
the Framers' words should be measured by the Framers' actions, rather than by their aspirations" and
"refused to assume that the Framers wanted their constitutional principles to transcend the shortcomings
of their own conduct.") Id. at 162-63. On the contemporary Court, Justice Scalia's version of originalism
comes closest to this debased Dred Scott type of originalism. For example, in sex discrimination and
family rights cases, he has argued that a history of discriminatory traditions and practices should prevail
over principles. See DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES, supra note 15, at 164, 215-17 (discussing Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 463 U.S. 248 (1983)). See also U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 566 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the "long tradition" of male military colleges should put such institutions
beyond the reach of the Equal Protection Clause, and contending that by applying more contemporary
understandings of gender equality the majority has engaged in "not law-but politics smuggled into
law.").
18. See generally Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction,supra note 14 (presenting evidence
from legislative history of the Reconstruction Amendments that Framers intended to exclude women,
and noting the dilemma this poses for adherents of originalism). Susan B. Anthony, Victoria Woodhull,
and Virginia Minor, nineteenth century women's suffrage activists, tried to persuade courts that because
women were "citizens" and thus included in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment's invocation of
the "privileges and immunities" of all citizens, and that voting should be regarded as a privilege and
immunity of citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited barring women from voting. They
failed in this argument, because the courts looked to the practice of barring women from voting, and to
the expressed intent of the Fourteenth Amendment male framers that it would not require female
suffrage, to hold that voting was not a privilege and immunity of citizenship. See Minor v. Happersett,
88 U.S. 162, 176-77 (1874) (noting that when the Constitution was ratified by nine states in 1788 and by
the thirteen original states in 1790, the right of suffrage was specifically granted to men only); Adam
Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the "Living Constitution,"76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1456, 1473 (2001) (discussing the suffragists abandonment of the original intent argument because
women's right to vote was clearly purposefully omitted from the Fourteenth Amendment).
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enlightened applications of principles informing the text." As Adam Winkler has
argued in examining the efforts of nineteenth century women's suffrage activists to
use the Fourteenth Amendment, these women were the first to adopt a method of
constitutional interpretation that became the prevailing interpretive method in the
latter part of the twentieth century-a method he dubs "living constitutionalism."' 9
They criticized the Dred Scott form of originalism that deferred to traditional
discriminatory practices even when those practices blatantly conflicted with
foundational principles, and argued that textual terms should be interpreted in
accordance with their underlying principles and ideals, informed by changing
societal needs and contemporary understandings of how those principles now
encompassed groups previously discriminated against.20 Now that constitutional
jurisprudence does regard the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees as extending to
women, our understanding of what constitutes a gender-based denial of equal
protection of the laws should be informed by the understandings of those
advocating for an end to gender subordination at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted.
In my "historically enlightened textualism" based on the neglected stories of
the nineteenth century women's rights activists, I am going to focus on the "Equal
Protection" Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Others have engaged in
compelling examinations of what history can teach us about resuscitating the
"Citizenship" Clause or the "Privileges and Immunities" Clause in ways that can be
helpful to the quest for gender equality, 2' or about the historical soundness of
grounding protection of marriage, family, and procreative rights, which are so
important for women's equality, primarily in the "liberty" guarantee of the Due
22
Process Clause.
The "Privileges and Immunities" Clause is not the only part of the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment that has been interpreted into oblivion: the concept of
"protection" embodied in the phrase "equal protection of the laws" is ignored in
contemporary Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 23 According to modem

19. Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon, supranote 18, at 1457.
20. Id. at 1479-83.
21. See, e.g., James W. Fox, Jr., Re-Readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or
Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers,91 KY. L.J. 67, 84-90 (2002-03) (finding that other
revisionist interpretations of Slaughterhouse wrongly perpetuate Justice Miller's misreading of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause); James W. Fox, Democratic Citizenship and Congressional
Reconstruction: Defining and Implementing the Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship, 13 TEMP.
POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 453, passim (2004) (discussing how citizenship and privilege and immunities
was defined throughout history); Rebecca E. Zeitlow, Belonging, Protection and Equality: The
Neglected Citizenship Clause and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PIrr. L. REV. 281, 307-32 (2000)
(suggesting that Congress could enforce the Citizenship Clause as a new source of civil rights legislation
necessitated by the decision in U.S. v. Morrison); William J. Rich, Taking "Privilegesor Immunities"
Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 195-98 (2002)
(supporting the view that history and traditions concerning the Constitution enables Congress and the
Judiciary to establish privileges or immunities for United States citizens).
22. DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES, supra note 15, passim (analyzing the evidence that protective
marital, family, and procreative liberty of the newly freed slaves was a central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
23. As Robin West has argued, both the formal "equal treatment" interpretation and the "substantive
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Supreme Court jurisprudence, one would think the text set forth an "equal
treatment" clause rather than an "Equal Protection" Clause. Judging from the gloss
the Court has read into the text in many race and gender equality cases, one would
think this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment says that: No state, through direct
24
action, and intentionally motivated by class-based discriminatory animus, may
deny facially equal treatment of the law to any person, nor may a state enact laws
or regulations that create facially different classifications for similarly situated
persons without compelling justification if the classification is based on race or
ethnicity25 or alienage26, or without significantly important justification if the
classification is based on gender,27 or without a legitimate rational basis if the
ground, such as age, 28 economic or social
classification is based on some other
29
class, mental or physical disability.
The nineteenth century women's rights activists' identification of the sources
of gender subordination, and their understanding of the multi-faceted ways the state
denied women the equal protection of the laws, can help us put the concept of
equality" interpretations that dominate contemporary Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and
scholarship
share one feature, and it what they share that renders them both problematic: they are both
interpretations, albeit conflicting ones, of equality, rather than of equal protection. They both
read the phrase in the clause as though the word protection were not in it: formalists, as
though the phrase demanded equal justice, and anti-subordinationists as though it demanded
substantive equality. By removing the word protection from the phrase, they leave it a
general mandate of equality and thus susceptible to straightforward political debate about the
meaning of that illusive promise.
Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretationof the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV.
111, 137 (1991).
24. See, e.g. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-47 (1976) (finding that a law that has a
racially disproportionate impact is not therefore automatically unconstitutional regardless of whether it
reflects a racially discriminatory purpose); Feeney v. Pers. Adm'r of Mass., 445 U.S. 901, 901 (1980)
(finding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit facially neutral state policies and laws that
have a disparate impact on blacks or women).
25. See, e.g, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003) (reiterating that race-based classifications
must be strictly scrutinized, and must rest on a compelling state interest).
26. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1977) (finding that state classification
determined by alienage are subject to strict scrutiny judicial analysis); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 381-82 (1971) (finding that state-imposed residency requirements were subject to strict scrutiny
judicial analysis).
27. See, e.g., U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1997) (finding that Virginia's justifications for
excluding women at military college do not satisfy the heightened burden on the state to justify laws that
classify based on gender); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (applying the rule that genderbased classifications must serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to
achieving those objectives to an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of alcohol to males under
twenty-one and women under eighteen).
28. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require states to make special accommodations for the disabled as long as actions
taken by the sate towards the disabled are rational).
29. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 347 (2001) (finding that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide a rational basis for enacting statutes that classify based
on age); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985) (finding that state
classifications based on mental retardation violate the Equal Protection Clause if there exists no rational
basis to impose the classification).

TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:429

"protection" back in the "Equal Protection" Clause, and thus interpret the
Fourteenth Amendment in ways more faithful to its history and ideals than the
laughably convoluted and qualified "equal treatment" doctrine that pervades
contemporary jurisprudence.
II. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS' CONCEPT OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF CITIZENS AND THE SOURCES OF WOMEN'S SUBORDINATION

The delegates at the 1848 women's rights convention met two decades before
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and more than a
century before U.S. law became embroiled in debates about whether legal equality
meant only eradicating formal legal race-or gender-based classifications so as to
extend formally similar legal treatment, or whether it meant eliminating facially
neutral legal structures that had the effect of perpetuating subordination. They also
met long before "feminism" was a political or philosophical term, and thus were
unconstrained by later debates that polarized feminist activists and legal scholars
about whether equality for women meant formal legal "equal treatment," or
whether such a standard was flawed as inextricably linked to a male norm such that
the law needed to take women's differences or particular needs into account.30
They felt no need to choose sides in the debate over whether "difference" or
31
"dominance" was the root of women's legal and social inequality.
What they were rooted in, and informed by, was the prevailing Lockean
republican liberal theory of their times, and in particular the abolition movement's
understandings of the meaning of the natural and inalienable rights of humans and
the concomitant principle of substantive equal protection of the laws. 32 The
abolition movement sought to hold the republic to its ideals, as expressed in the
Declaration of Independence, that all men were created equal and entitled to equal
and full enjoyment of natural rights. Abolitionists frequently invoked the
Declaration, with its emphasis on the fundamental humanity and rights of all
people, and used it as the source for potent criticisms of the practices that rendered
some humans chattel outside the protection of the law, deprived of the fundamental
rights of bodily security, self-determination, familial association, free thought and
education.33 Abolitionists who became leading members of the Reconstruction
Congress and key drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Charles

30. See generally, Lucinda M. Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity
andthe Workplace Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1118 (1986).
31. See generally, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference andDominance: On Sex Discrimination,in
Feminism Unmodified 32 - 45 (Harv. Univ. Press 1987).
32. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (New
York: Collier Books 1965) (documenting the influential roles that the natural rights ideology of the
abolitionist movement had on the drafters and proponents of the post-Civil War amendments). This
landmark and influential book, originally issued as THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (Univ. Calif. Press 1951), is well worth frequent study by anyone who professes an
interest in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
33. See DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES, supra note 15, at 224-25 (discussing family values-as they
pertain to the effects of slavery on the marital and family ties of African-American Families-and the
protection that the Fourteenth Amendment eventually provided to these families).
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Sumner, John Bingham, and Thaddeus Stevens, characterized their task as fulfilling
the letter of the Declaration's "self-evident truths" and "regenerating the
Constitution and laws of this country... according to the principles of the
Declaration of Independence. 34 As Jacobus tenBroek explains in his landmark
history of the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the abolitionists
regarded the Declaration, more so than the Constitution, as the crucial foundational
document for the American republic, one which brought the concept of a natural
and inalienable individual right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness into the
constitutional law of the nation.3"
Many of the women who became key architects of the nineteenth century
women's movement, including Sarah and Angelina Grimke, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Lucretia Mott, first were active in the abolition
movement.36 The rhetoric of abolition, with its emphasis on natural human rights,
provoked the realization in these activist women that the principles of equal
enjoyment of inalienable rights applied fully to women. As Peggy Cooper Davis
notes, the notion of "a human entitlement to basic, natural rights was the
ideological link between the antislavery struggle and the struggle to extend civil
rights... to women. American women embraced this underlying human rights
commitment in abolitionism and then refashioned it to do the work of women's
liberation."37
The innovation of the women's rights activists was to take the prevailing
concepts of human rights, privileges and immunities of citizens, and full and equal
protection of the law, which abolitionsists endorsed, and apply them to the situation
of women. They drew explicit comparisons between women's status and slaves'
status, and made arguments about their own fundamental humanity and entitlement
to rights and equality.38 In 1860, Elizabeth Cady Stanton addressed the annual
meeting of the American Anti-Slavery Society and spoke eloquently of the
connections between the sexual and physical degradation of slaves and women,
their confinement to separate spheres and their subjugation to the whims and
violations of their white male masters.3 9 The women abolitionist activists wrote
letters and pamphlets in which they drew explicit comparisons between the legal
regime for women founded in Blackstone's Commentaries, and the laws enacted by

34. Id. at 225.
35. TENBROEK, supranote 32, at 62, n.20, 96, 102,210-11.
36. ELLEN DuBois, ed., THE ELIZABETH CADY STANTON/SUSAN B. ANTHONY READER 8-9, 18-22

(Northeastern Univ. Press rev. ed. 1992)[hereinafter STANTON/ANTHONY READER]. Male abolitionists
criticized women, including the Grimke sisters, for publicly speaking and becoming too active in the
abolition movement, and tried to exclude them or limit their role to auxiliary work. This prompted the
women antislavery activists to think more explicitly about the connections between their subordinated
status and that of the slaves, and to start advocating for women's equality. Id. at 8-9.
37. DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES, supranote 15, at 27.
38. See BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK,

ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW:

HISTORY,

PRACTICE AND THEORY 33-35 (Little Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1996); ELLEN DuBois, FEMINISM AND
SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-1869 at 3234(1978).
39. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Speech to the Anniversary of the American Anti-Slavery Society (1860),
in STANTON/ANTHONY READER, supra note 36, at 78-85.
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40
slaveholders to govern and subjugate slaves.
Just as the abolition movement looked to the Declaration of Independence and
its articulation of the nation's founding republican ideology as the basis for its
understanding of human rights, for the need to include slaves within the principles
of equality, and the obligations of government to fully and equally protect the
human rights of all citizens, so too did the women's rights proponents who signed
the Declaration of Sentiments. While today we might look at the 1848 document's
explicit paraphrasing of the Declaration of Independence as merely a clever
rhetorical device for highlighting the hypocrisy of male lawmakers, to the drafters
and signatories of the 1848 Declaration it was meant to signify their motivating
philosophy of human rights and equality and to place their demands for women's
equality firmly within the familiar founding principles of the nation.
The drafters and signatories of the 1848 Declaration, like the abolitionists,
were deeply committed to the principle that all human beings had "inalienable
rights," and that equality was both part of these natural rights and a necessary
condition to enjoying them. As an abolitionist member of the Reconstruction
Congress explained, in advocating for the adoption of the equal protection clause,
its natural rights foundation was implicit:

Is it not the undeniable right of every subject of the government to
receive "equal protection of the laws" with every other subject? How can
he have and enjoy equal rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness" without "equal protection of the laws"? How indeed? Or
without the protection of the laws? The Declaration of Independence,
natural rights, protection, equal protection - all this is tied together in one
neat little package in the equal protection clause of section 1 of the
4
Fourteenth Amendment. '
The conception of equality and the means for achieving it embodied in the
Declaration of Sentiments cannot be isolated from its underlying vision of human
rights and the obligation of government to protect those rights. 42 The rights of men,
which the 1848 Declaration claimed for women as well, included more than just the
phrase "the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. '43 The motivating
conception of natural rights held by both the abolitionists and the women's rights
activists included those rights that would actualize life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness. 44 They included the "inalienable right to one's own body" and
personality-ownership of one's self, one's labor and property, and the right of
self-determination, including the right not to be degraded or rendered dependent in
a way that left one subject to abuses of private as well as public power. 45 The
40. See, e.g., Sarah Grimke on the Legal Disabilitiesof Women (1838), in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN
WOMEN'S HISTORY: DOCUMENTS AND ESSAYS 201-03 (Mary Beth Norton ed. 1989), quoted in RHODE

ET AL., supranote 38, at 35 n.18.
41. TENBROEK, supra note 32, at 210.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 103.
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family was the locus of subordination of women, just as the master-slave
relationship and its denial of family rights was the source of subordinating
dependency for blacks.46 From this flowed the right not to be reduced to chattel
status, the right to contract, to hold and dispose of property, to not have one's labor
coerced, to pursue the education that would enable one to be a free thinker and to
pursue whatever professional pursuits one's free mind wished, to worship freely
and to learn and preach the gospel. It also included the right to personal security,
and to be free from private violence without legal recourse as well as from state
imposed violence. It included the right to form family relationships without state
interference, as well as the right not to have the state disrupt or tear apart one's
47
family against one's desires and will.

Equality in the view of the abolitionists and the women's rights activists was
not merely a concept of comparative similarity of legal treatment, but was a more
substantive notion of the right to have government provide equal protection for
each person's ability to exercise their rights.48 In order to have equal enjoyment of
these rights, given that the fundamental purpose of government was to secure and
protect inalienable human rights, the government had to do more than avoid racial
or gender classification or extend formal equal treatment of existing laws that
might leave conditions of social degradation through private action unchecked.
Indeed, providing effective federal remedies for victims of the violence of the Ku
Klux Klan, which the states tolerated, encouraged, or ignored, was one of the
central concerns of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. 49 As Jacobus
tenBroek explains the fundamental concept of equal protection:
[t]he proposition was nothing more nor less than this: because every
person living in a social state needs, desires, and has a right to the
protection of the law - for which governments are instituted among men,
and to which human beings are entitled by their humanity, slaves and free
negroes [and women] must receive legal protection in their fundamental
rights along with all other human beings ....The equal protection of the
laws is violated fully as much, perhaps even more, by private invasions
made possible through failure of government to act as by discriminatory
laws and officials ....The fact that such protection is supplied to others

makes the failure to supply it to the victims an abrogation of the standard
of equality in the provision of legal protection.50
The concept of equal protection would be offended both by discriminatory
state action, and by state inaction "that fails to supply protection against private

46. See DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES, supra note 15, at 108-17. See also Reva Siegel, She the
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalismand the Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 947,

951 (2002).
47. TENBROEK, supranote 32, at 97-98.
48. Id. at 96.
49. Id. at 162-63. See also West, supranote 23, at 131-32 (describing the impact of KKK activity
on the creation ofthe Fourteenth Amendment).
50. TENBROEK, supranote 32, at 97-98.

TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:429

inroads."'" It included both the notion of "full" enjoyment of rights, and that of
"equal" enjoyment:
So "full enjoyment of the right of person and property" is the same as
"equal enjoyment" of those rights; and the "full enjoyment" of such
rights depends on first, the absence of discriminatory state legislative or
other official action, and second, the presence of adequate affirmative
protection to prevent or cope with individual invasions. This, then, is
equal protection. 2
As Robin West has noted, the historical evidence that the equal protection
clause was meant to obligate the federal government to protect people against
private violence, especially when the states failed to do so, is extensive and
uncontroversial. 3 She concludes that among historians, the application of the equal
protection clause to reach private violence is an uncontestedmeaning.14
Moreover, the concept of equal protection of human rights was both
comparative and an absolute individual right. Based on the abolitionist
understanding of rights and equality that was shared by the women's rights
delegates and signatories of the 1848 delegation and later by the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to say that the rich and the poor, black and white, men and
women have equal rights to protection is "not saying that the poor man would have
no complaint if neither he nor the rich man received protection."5 And, by modem
extension, if women by virtue of their social situation and differential
responsibilities or vulnerabilities need forms of protection for rights-such as the
right to bodily self-determination, or the right to be free of violence within the
home-that men do not need, it would be a violation of the equal protection of the
laws to deny women the affirmative protection for their right simply because the
form ofprotection did not pertain to men.
We see these conceptions reflected throughout the Resolutions and the
Declaration of Sentiments adopted by the delegates to the 1848 women's rights
convention, starting at the outset by explicitly invoking the language and principles
of the Declaration of Independence, with the crucial addition of the words "and
women":
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed. 56

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.at 179.
Id.
West, supranote 23, at 131-32.
Id.at 132.
Id. at 176.
THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN FEMINISM, supra note 4, at 85-89.
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The accompanying Resolutions also passed at the convention state:
Whereas, the great precept of nature is conceded to be "that man shall
pursue his own true happiness." Blackstone, in his commentaries,
remarks, that this law of nature being coeval with mankind.., is of
course superior in obligation to any other .... No human laws are of any
validity if contrary to this .... Resolved, that such laws as conflict, in
any way, with the true and substantial happiness of woman, are contrary
to the great precept of nature and of no validity. Resolved, that all laws
which prevent woman from occupying such a station in society as her
conscience shall dictate, or which place her in a position inferior to that
of man, are contrary to the great precept of nature, and therefore of no
force or authority. Resolved, that woman is man's equal .... and the
highest good of the race demands that she shall be recognized as such.57
The Declaration then goes on to list several specific examples of men's and
the law's usurpations and injuries towards women. The listed grievances are not
only about laws that overtly exclude on the basis of gender, but also encompass
nongovernmental actions within the private realms of family, church, employment,
and school. The Declaration of Sentiments recognizes that women were deprived of
their human rights and equality of economic, political and civil rights by operation
of law, by entrenched institutional structures, by social practice, and by private,
familial violence without effective remedy or legal protection. The list includes: her
exclusion from the elective franchise; her consequent lack of voice in the formation
of public laws and policies; her "civilly dead" chattel status upon marriage and the
legal sanctioning of "chastisement," no matter how violent and harmful, by the
husband; the laws that deprived her of rights to her property and wages; divorce
laws drawn only from the perspective and for the benefit of men; women's
exclusion from higher education and the "most honorable" and remunerative
professions, including the teaching of law, medicine, and theology; women's
official subordination within the Church; the application of moral double standards
to women; and the overarching undermining of women's self-confidence and selfrespect that could lead women to accept "a dependent and abject life.""8
Thus, the signatories of the 1848 Declaration understood the falseness of the
public/private dichotomy long before contemporary feminist theorists
deconstructed it. Through their lived experience and political philosophy they
understood that the locus of domination, degradation, and oppression can just as
often be private realms, where the domination operated not by explicit command of
the public realm of law, but because of the failure of the laws and government
action to provide recourse and protection against unbridled private usurpations of
women's fundamental human rights. In calling for change in women's condition,
the Declaration does not single out only "unjust laws" that treat women differently
from men, but it goes further by including "social and religious degradation" as
among the conditions that must be eliminated. It then "insist[s] that [women] have

57. Id. at 82.
58. Id. at 86-88.
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immediate admission to all the rights and privileges which belong to them as
citizens of the United States."59 Note the expansiveness of this call; they do more
than insist on all the rights and privileges that men currently have. Obviously, the
signatories wanted that, but they also wanted full protection for women's human
rights.
While intentionally invoking notions of citizenship, human rights, and equal
protection of rights that were familiar from the Declaration of Independence and
frequently invoked by the abolitionist framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
women's rights Declaration was also a radical challenge to current understandings
about the reach or inclusiveness of these principles to women and the proper social
and political roles for women. Women's exclusion from the vote, from public
affairs, and from the full rights of citizenship was justified, as John Adams wrote,
"because their delicacy renders them unfit for practice and experience in the great
businesses of life, and the hardy enterprises of war, as well as the arduous affairs of
state. Besides, their attention is so much engaged with the necessary nurture of their
children, that nature has made them fittest for domestic cares. ' 60 During the
Congressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, representatives similarly
argued that women did not need the vote because of their family roles, and because
their husbands would take their interests into account when casting their ballots. 61
Blackstone's Commentaries, the most influential legal text of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, justified women's exclusion from legal protection
and the rights of citizenship because of the rule of coverture, the merging of the
wife into the husband, thus eradicating any separate legal identity for the woman.
Interestingly, the most widely used American edition of Blackstone in the early
nineteenth century, the Tucker edition of 1803, had footnote commentary by
Edward Christian that scathingly criticized the rules of coverture for their profound
lack of "respect and favour to the female sex.

' 62

Many of Christian's criticisms

were picked up and cited by the Grimkes and other abolitionist/women's rights
activists, and are echoed in the Declaration of Sentiments: the taxation of women
without representation; married women's deprivation of their property and
inheritance rights; legal sanctioning of a husband's violence against his wife, even
murder.
By directly challenging the prevailing notion that men were naturally superior
to women, and claiming for women full humanity and entitlement as man's equal
to all the human rights of citizenship, the Declaration of Sentiments challenged
society and the law to live up to its own professed ideals and foundational
principles.
Thus, the Declaration demands elimination of overt gender
classifications in law, or formal equal treatment with men, and also recognizes that
women may need unique recognition and protection to enjoy full human rights,

59. Id. at 88.
60. BABCOCK, ET AL, supra note 38, at 10-11 (citing Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan
(May 26, 1776) in IX The Works ofJohn Adams 375 (Charles Adams ed. 1856)).
61. See Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction,supra note 14, at 1236 (discussing the "mindset
that made it seem plausible and indeed natural that the [Fourteenth] Amendemnt would secure different
and lesser rights for women").
62. BABCOCK, ET AL., supra note 38, at 17, 21, 22.
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such as particular consideration of the "happiness of women" in the laws of
divorce, or protections fashioned to eliminate the "dependent and abject" lives so
many women were constrained to lead.
The Declaration and its resolutions also argue that society as a whole could be
improved by greater injection into the public realm of women's values, experiences
and perspectives, Society-and thus its laws-had an obligation to protect work in
the supposedly private sphere of home and family, not only for societal well-being,
but also to eliminate women's degradation and lack of self-confidence and selfrespect. Whereas the notions of "Republican motherhood" advanced by many
women and men in the early nineteenth century to laud women's virtues and
advance their role as inculcators of civic values "articulated a social power based
' 63
the
on [women's] special female qualities rather than on general human rights,
women
for
role
social
and
political,
public,
a
Declaration of Sentiments advances
based on both their special qualities and on their essential human equality to men,
resting securely in general human rights principles.
An examination of the activist work, legislative reform efforts and speeches
by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and other nineteenth century
women's rights proponents that followed the Seneca Falls convention further
highlights that their analysis of women's inequality was based on far more than
overt disparate treatment embodied in gender classified laws. The women's rights
conception of gender inequality, like the abolitionists' understanding of racial
inequality, rested on social, economic and personal subordination. In their view,
the need to amend the Constitution or pass new laws to realize the human rights
principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of Sentiments
was about ending both the formal legal denial of political and civil rights to
women, such as the right to vote and sit on juries, or to contract and own property,
and the subordination that flowed from the disparate impact of seemingly neutral
laws, as well as from governmental tolerance of private oppressions and violence
against women within the home.
Stanton focused on women's role within the family and the institution of
marriage and the laws governing divorce and child custody as central to women's
subordination. 64 She spoke as often about the marriage and divorce laws, rape law
and marital rape, domestic violence, sexual and reproductive autonomy, and the
regime of coverture, as she did about the right to vote and other civil rights. For
her, winning the right to vote was partly a means to an end. When male
abolitionists gained control of the Reconstruction Congress, they told the women's
rights activists that they would have to postpone their demands for women's
equality lest extending the franchise and family rights to women would jeopardize
65
the more urgent goal of securing equality for recently freed male slaves. Enraged

63. NANCY F. CoTn, THE BONDS OF WOMENHOOD: "WOMEN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND 1780-

1835 200 (1977).
64. Ellen DuBois, Introductionto STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS, supra note 3, at xvii-xviii.
65. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "Gerrit Smith on Petitions," STANTON/SUSAN B. ANTHONY
READER 119-124, supra note 36 (noting that an abolitionist refused to sign a petition extending
universal suffrage for men and women because to demand protection for women against her oppressors
would jeopardize the Black man's chance of securing protection against his oppressors).
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by this abandonment, Stanton and others realized that men would never willingly
give up their privilege and power within the family and economic world by passing
laws aimed at ending gender subordination. As Stanton noted in one of her postCivil War public lectures, the source of "opposition to woman's equality in the
state ...[is that] men are not ready to recognize it in the home. This is the real
danger apprehended in giving women the ballot, for as long as man makes,
interprets, and executes the laws for himself, he holds the power under any
system."66 If women could vote, she assumed that they would gain sufficient
political voice and power to make the necessary legal changes, and that the
increased public responsibility of the franchise would encourage women to
challenge the confines of the family realm and become more politically aware and
publicly active. 67
Stanton regarded the facially gender neutral laws prohibiting divorce that
prevailed in many states as a particular source of women's subordination and
inequality. She urged that divorce law reform, to permit marriages to be freely
dissoluble at the behest of either party, be adopted as part of the platform of the
women's rights convention, and she advocated for divorce law reform before the
New York State legislature. 68 She argued that a prohibition on divorce, or limiting
divorce to certain reasons, put disproportionate burdens and inequalities on women.
Social, economic and legal arrangements forced women to marry even if they held
no love for a man, and then made wives economically dependent on their husbands,
forced them to submit to their husbands' sexual will, and left them vulnerable to
domestic violence without sufficient legal redress. In this sort of world, the
inability to get out of a marriage often left women trapped in a life of degradation,
physical harm, and complete economic dependence. Stanton cited examples where
prominent men had abandoned their wives and children, and the state neither
allowed the woman to divorce, nor bothered to enforce the man's support
obligations. She regarded laws prohibiting divorce as a necessary step "in order to
establish man's authority over woman. '69 She analogized "marriage as an
indissoluble tie" to "slavery for women."7 "There is no other human slavery that
knows such depths of degradations as a wife chained to a man whom she neither
loves nor respects, no other slavery so disastrous in its consequences on the race, or
to individual respect, growth and development." She argued that the right to
divorce was a human right, because "it is a sin against nature, the family, the state
for a man or woman to live together in the marriage relation in continual

66. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "'HomeLife, " c. 1875, in STANTON/ANTHONY READER 131, supra
note
36, at 132.
67. Ellen DuBois, Introduction to STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS, supra note 3, at xix; see also Siegel,
She the People, supra note 46, at 987-993 (discussing how the movement for women's suffrage
repudiated prevailing conception of women's relationship to the state as emanating from her family
role).
68.

STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS, supra note 3, at 215-25.

69. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "Home Life," c. 1875, in STANTON/ANTHONY READER, supra note 66,
at 131-38.
70. Id.at 133.
71. Id.
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antagonism, indifference, disgust."72
Stanton's advocacy of divorce law reform ran into a powerful "formal
equality" critique. A male delegate to the 1860 New York National Woman's
Rights Convention moved to strike any provisions regarding divorce law from the
platform, on the ground "that as marriage concerned man and woman alike, and
73
that the laws bore equally on them, women had no special ground for complaint."
Horace Greeley, a noted editorialist and legal reformer, took the same position.
Stanton wrote a powerful letter to the New York Tribune, arguing against this
cramped formal legal equality view.
[A]n immense difference rests in the fact that man has made the laws
cunningly and selfishly for his own purpose. From Coke down to Kent,
who can cite one clause of the marriage contract where woman has the
advantage? ....The contract of marriage is by no means equal ....In
entering this compact, the man gives up nothing that he before possessed,
he is a man still; while the legal existence of the woman is suspended
during marriage, and, henceforth, she is known but in and through her
husband. She is nameless, purseless, childless-though a woman, an
heiress, and a mother ....If the contract be equal, whence come the
terms "marital power," "marital rights," "obedience and restraint,"
"dominion and control," "power and protection," etc.? The laws on
divorce are quite as unequal as those on marriage; yea, far more so. The
advantages seem to be all on one side and the penalties on the other. In
be not the guilty party, the wife goes
the case of divorce, if the husband
74
out of the partnership penniless.
Stanton and Anthony also regarded the state's inaction against domestic
violence, and the awarding of custody over children to violent men, as causes of
women's subordination. In 1869, the nation became riveted by the trial of Daniel
McFarland for shooting Albert Richardson, who wanted to marry McFarland's
estranged wife, Abby. Daniel McFarland had been an abusive husband, and while
she was seeking a divorce, Abby sought the solace of Richardson, a family friend.
After the divorce was finalized, and Richardson and Abby prepared to marry,
McFarland shot him. At his murder trial, he argued that the divorce should be
nullified because it was against his will, and that he was justified in shooting to
protect his marital property. McFarland was acquitted of murder by reason of
insanity, because another man's interest in his wife was just provocation. Further,
the court awarded him sole custody of his and Abby's son, because of her
indiscretions. Stanton and Anthony organized meetings and protests of women
about this decision, and used it as the vehicle for criticizing the laws regarding
marriage, divorce, custody, and the lack of legal redress for abused wives. They
also criticized the legal system, because "neither women nor slaves can testify
against their supposed masters," and thus Abby's tale of her abusive marriage was
72. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Speech to the McFarland-RichardsonProtestMeeting (May 1869), in
STANTON/ANTHONY READER, supra note 36, at 129.
73. STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS, supra note 3, at 218-19.
74. Id. at 221-23.
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kept out of court. Their critique of the law went far beyond notions of formal
equality:
[H]ow comes it that a man who by our courts has been declared so insane
that he may commit murder without being morally responsible to the
state is let loose on society to repeat such depradations while the helpless
victim of his hate and lust still lives and is liable at any moment to be
sacrificed by his hand ....Although by the revised statutes of this state

the mother is the equal guardian of her child today, yet in the late trial we
have the anomaly of a criminal acquitted on ground of insanity, walking
out of court with his child by his hand, its natural protector, while the
mother of sound mind capable of supporting it, is denied the custody of
its person.75
Stanton and Anthony's critique of marriage and divorce was also connected to
their concerns about domestic violence, marital rape, and forced pregnancy within
marriage. They advocated sexual "sovereignty" for women as a natural right, and
argued for a legal allocation of rights that entitled a woman's wishes regarding sex
and reproduction to outweigh her husband's. 76 That the law did not protect such
sexual autonomy, was also a central reason for women's subordination. Anthony's
concern about domestic violence led her to become active in the temperance
movement, and to critique the disparate impact of seemingly gender neutral laws
regarding alcohol. She also connected alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and the
need for divorce, and advocated for laws that made drunkenness a grounds for
divorce.77
While Anthony, Stanton, and other nineteenth century women's rights
activists achieved some of their goals, such as divorce law and marital property law
reform, by articulating their understanding of natural rights and the multiple public
and private causes of women's subordination to legislators, they also attempted to
use the recently enacted Fourteenth Amendment to achieve others, such as the right
to vote. When they turned their attention to the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than
making an argument that rested on the framers' intent, which was to extend the
vote only to black men and not to women,78 they invoked the principles that were
understood at the time to be behind the words such as "privileges and immunities
of citizenship," and "equal protection." They argued that the principles embodied
in the meaning of these words, combined with evolving societal understandings
about women's rights, meant that women, as citizens, had the right to vote, since it
was a quintessential privilege and immunity of citizenship. If states did not
recognize this right, Congress had an affirmative obligation to do so, in order to
75. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Speech to the McFarland-RichardsonProtest Meeting, (May 1869), in
STANTON/ ANTHONY READER, supra note 36, at 127.
76. STANTON/ANTHONY READER, supranote 36, at 96-98.
77. Id.at 15-17, 42, 174.
78. See Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 1234 (stating the framer's intent as establishing equality
among the races and giving Blacks all the rights enjoyed by white people); Winkler, supra note 18, at
1473 (finding that the right to vote for women was "purposefully omitted from the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment").
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79
provide equal and full protection of the right. They were ultimately unsuccessful
in convincing courts that voting was a privilege and immunity of national
citizenship that automatically extended to women, since judges resorted to the
expressed intent of legislators who drafted and voted on the amendment that it
80
would not extend the vote to women.
While their specific argument about the right to vote was rebuffed on original
intent grounds, their articulation of the natural rights ideology that informed the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the meaning of equal protection was never
repudiated. Indeed, in these regards theirs was a shared understanding of principles
with the abolitionist framers, differing only in the extent these principles would
apply to particular women's demands.
In 1872, acting on her conviction that women as citizens had the constitutional
ight to vote, Susan B. Anthony went to her local Rochester, New York Board of
Registry, persuaded the voting inspector that as a citizen she did have the right to
vote, and registered to vote. She and several other women then went to the polls on
8
Election Day and cast their ballots. The federal government charged her with the
crime of fraudulent voting under an 1870 statute enacted to prevent southern
ballots. 8 2
opponents of black rights from diluting the black vote by casting multiple
To muster public support for her position in the hope of influencing jurors at her
trial, Anthony traveled around the Rochester area giving public speeches
articulating her understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. As historian Ellen
DuBois notes in her introductory commentary to this speech, "[i]nalienable natural
rights, irrespective of sex, was Anthony's major theme, and the dominant political
ideology of the period."83 Going well beyond the right to vote, Anthony
encapsulated many years of thought by her and Stanton, arguing that the laws and
conditions governing marriage made it a condition of involuntary servitude for
many women. She noted that the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied
to all "persons," thus undoubtedly including women, while the second clause,
containing the principles of privileges and immunities, due process, and equal
protection, meant that all legal forms of discrimination against women were now
null and void.8 4 She also argued that laws and practices that condoned or excused
domestic violence, deprived women of the custody of their children, rendered
women destitute upon the end of a marriage, did not give women rights in their
wages, did not permit them to sue, be sued, or to testify, all violated women's right
to equal protection of the laws.85 In articulating her constitutional understanding,
Anthony made it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment established both a

79. See Winkler, supra note 18, at 1482-87, 1499-1501 (describing the movement's new argument
in the 1870s that the Constitution had evolved and required women's suffrage).
80. Id. See Minor v. Hapersett, 88 U.S. 162, 176 (1874) (noting that women were excluded from
suffrage in nearly all the States by the express provision of their constitutions and laws and that if
suffrage was intended to be included within its obligations, language better adapted to express that intent
would most certainly have been employed).
81. Winkler, supranote 18, at 1506.
82. Id. at 1506-07.
83. STANTON/ANTHONY READER,

84. Id. at 158.
85. Id. at 153-65.

supra note 36, at 152.
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prohibition of class-based discrimination, and an affirmative obligation of
government to protect the full and equal enjoyment of natural rights:
There is and can be but one safe principle of government-equal rights to
all. Discrimination against any class on account of color, race, nativity,
sex, property, culture, can but embitter and disaffect that class, and
thereby endanger the safety of the whole people. Clearly, then, the
national government must not only define the rights of citizens, but must
stretch out its powerful hand and protect them in every State in this
Union.
....
[T]he one grand principle settled by the war and the reconstruction
legislation, is the supremacy of the national government to protect the
citizens of the United States in their right to freedom and the elective
franchise....
We ask the judges to render unprejudiced opinions of the law, and
wherever there is room for doubt to give the benefit to the side of liberty
and equal rights for women, remembering that, as [Senator] Sumner says,
"The true rule of interpretation under our National Constitution,
especially since its amendments, is that anything for human rights is
constitutional, everything againsthuman rights unconstitutional. 8 6
By quoting Charles Sumner, a leading member of the Reconstruction
Congress and architect of the post-Civil War amendments, Anthony was
demonstrating that women's understanding of the principles of the newly amended
Constitution was the same as the abolitionist thought that influenced the drafters.
By arguing that women were citizens entitled both to be free from discriminatory
classifications in law and to affirmative protection by Congress of the full and
equal enjoyment of human rights, Anthony was not articulating a radical new
vision of the Fourteenth Amendment. She was simply arguing that the principles
applied directly to women's legal and social situation just as much as they did to
the newly emancipated former slaves.
The nineteenth century women's rights activists, in their analysis of the
sources of women's subordinate inequality, and their efforts to demonstrate how
the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to women, teach us many
things about the contemporaneous understandings of the amendment's key terms
and principles. Like the abolitionist framers, they understood "privileges and
immunities of citizenship" to refer to inalienable natural rights. Protection of all
persons, male and female, in the full and equal enjoyment of their human rights
was the fundamental concept of the equal protection clause. The requirement of
equal protection meant that Congress could overturn facially discriminatory state
laws, but it also meant much more. It imposed an affirmative duty on government
to protect rights, whether the encroachment derived from the unequal impact of
facially neutral laws, or from the state's tolerance of or failure to provide adequate
remedy against private abuses, violence, and harm. The amendment did not
establish any realms that were quintessentially matters for the state, such as family,
86. Id.at 161, 163-64 (emphasis in original).

Spring 2004]

PUTTING "PROTECTION" BACK IN THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

449

while placing others within federal power. Since the family and state laws affecting
it were an important locus for the exercise and realization of fundamental human
rights, and for the denial of them, the federal government had an affirmative
obligation to protect women's full and equal enjoyment of family and personal
rights, and thus could undo state legislation, or enact positive legislation touching
on matters such as marriage, divorce, childrearing, bodily security and sexual
autonomy. Thus, facially neutral state laws, such as a prohibition on or limitations
of the right to divorce, were a violation of equal protection. Similarly, other facially
neutral laws such as spousal tort immunity and marital rape laws, which left
victims of domestic violence without a damages or criminal remedy, also violated
equal protection. Interpretations of facially neutral laws such as those defiming just
provocation and insanity, or awarding custody to the morally more fit parent, that
had the effect of condoning male violence within the family, as in the McFarland
case, were also violations of equal protection. Laws that failed to recognize or
protect a woman's right to refuse a husband's sexual advances or to control her
fertility also violated equal protection. Governmental inaction or inattention to
persistent problems of private violence inflicted on women, such as violence within
the family, also violated equal protection. While some of these particular
applications to women's situation, such as Stanton and Anthony's analysis of
marriage as a condition of servitude, were controversial at the time, the principle of
an affirmative governmental obligation to protect citizens in the enjoyment of
familial rights and from private violence were well accepted and widely understood
as core principles of equal protection.87
When we examine contemporary Supreme Court gender equality
jurisprudence in light of this historical understanding of the meaning of equal
protection as applied to women, it is apparent that the Court has strayed far from
the history and meaning of the principles embodied in the text. When the views of
the abolitionist framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the women's rights
activists who extended their anti-slavery human rights principles to women are
85
taken into account, the decision in United States v. Morrison, holding that
Congress lacked power under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact
89
the civil rights remedy part of the Violence Against Women Act, is about as
9
wrong, historically and textually, as a decision can get. " The Court held that the
87. See TENBROEK, supra note 32, at 97-98, 102-03,177-79 (stating that Congress is authorized to
supply protection to all men and the states have an affirmative duty not only to protect but also to not
pass discriminatory legislation). See DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES, supra note 15, passim (analyzing the
intention to protect the personal, family, sexual and procreative autonomy of the newly freed slaves).
Davis points out that it was the unsuccessful opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment who argued that
family rights should remain an exclusive matter for the states, beyond the scope of federal protection.
Id. at 243.
88. 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
89. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994), codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
90. Another decision dealing with intrafamily violence that is equally wrong from the perspective of
the historical meaning of equal protection is DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), which held that the state had no affirmative obligation to protect a child,
who had been placed in his father's custody by the state court, and who was supposed to be monitored
by the Department of Social Services, from violence by his father. Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist
Interpretation,supra note 23, at 142. The plaintiff in this case, the child's surviving mother, based her
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Fourteenth Amendment does not reach private acts of violence, 9' so that Congress'
voluminous evidence of the failure of many states to provide effective remedies for
violence against women was essentially irrelevant to the Fourteenth Amendment
issue. Moreover, the Court exalted federalism concerns over gender equality by
emphasizing that since legislating for the family sphere was traditionally reserved
for the states, and was thus "truly local," there was no national federal interest in
protecting this realm of life. 92
The record in Morrison reads like a textbook example of the denial of equal
protection of the law, when the concept of "protection" is properly restored to the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court acknowledged that Congress passed the
Violence Against Women Act based on a "voluminous record" demonstrating "that
many participants in state justice systems are perpetuating an array of erroneous
stereotypes and assumptions" "often result[ing] in insufficient investigation and
prosecution of gender motivated crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior and
credibility of the victims of that crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for
those who are actually convicted of gender-motivated violence."93 Yet the Court
was dismissive of the contention that this amounted to a form of state sponsored
gender discrimination that denied equal protection of the laws. 94 Robert Post and
Reva Siegel accuse the Court of failing to openly grapple with the evidence that
systemic gender bias in state fora could leave a victim of violence without a
remedy, and thus without equal protection of the law. They contend that "[t]o have
faced this question openly would have been to acknowledge the civil rights remedy,
not as a species of family or criminal law, but as an antidiscrimination statute with
deep roots in the Court's own Section 1jurisprudence."95 Even more importantly,
to have faced the history of the Fourteenth Amendment openly, informed by the
women's rights activists' understanding of how its terms and principles could apply
to practices that subordinated women, would have led to an acknowledgement that
VAWA had equally deep roots in the uncontested historical meaning of Section 1,
in particular the concept of equal protection of the law.
As the abolitionist framers of the Fourteenth Amendment made clear, and the
women's rights activists reiterated, the Equal Protection Clause was intended to
allow Congress to provide for effective redress against private acts of violence
when the states did not. Moreover, since women's role in the family, including
argument on the Due Process clause, rather than on equal protection. The Court held that the Due
Process clause imposed no affirmative obligations on government. While it may not have made a
difference to the Court, which by this time was locked into its comparative equal treatment
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, and has rarely ruled based on the clause's true history, a
state ignoring and failing to redress private violence, especially when it placed the child in the hands of
the abuser and then overlooked evidence of the mounting damage, is about as clear an instance of a
denial of any protection of the law, as well as equal protection, as one can find.
91. 529 U.S. at 621 (discussing U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883)).
92. Id. at 619. See Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
AntidiscriminationLegislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L.J. 441, 482, 524 (2000) (arguing
tht by classifying claims under the Violence Against Women Act as a matter of domestic relations, the
Court weighed federalism over gender equality).
93. Morrison,529 U.S. at 620.
94. Id. at 620-24.
95. Post & Siegel, supranote 92, at 524.
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their unique susceptibility to violence within the home, was a central reason for
women's inability to fully and equally enjoy their inalienable human rights,
including the rights to self-determination and bodily security, the Equal Protection
Clause was intended to upset the previous balance of federalism in this area and
gave the federal government an affirmative obligation to intervene.
CONCLUSION

So why has contemporary sex equality jurisprudence strayed so far from the
historical understanding of the meaning of equal protection that a decision like
Morrison commanded not a single dissenting vote96 to its holding that Congress
lacked power under Section five to provide a federal remedy against gendermotivated violence? One reason is that there has been a general erasure of the true
abolitionist, anti-slavery history of the Fourteenth Amendment from Supreme
Court jurisprudence, starting with the infamous SlaughterHouse and Plessy v.
Fergusoncases. 97 Similarly, the contemporaneous understandings of the nineteenth
century women's rights activists have never previously been appreciated as a valid
and valuable source for understanding the meaning of equal protection and its
applicability to women. By the time the Supreme Court acknowledged, in the
1970's, that the Equal Protection Clause did apply to women, the Justices and the
advocates drew on the racial classification cases emanating from the 1950s and
1960s civil rights movement, which had already enshrined the equal treatment
principle. More fundamentally, another reason may be that even today, the
conservative majority on the Court is no more ready to take the thinking of Stanton
and Anthony to heart than were their abolitionist friends who drafted the
Fourteenth Amendment. If we take seriously the true meaning of the obligation of
government to provide equal protection, and fully apply that meaning to gender
relations, the necessary socio-legal transformations of the supposedly private realm
of domestic relations may be more than many are ready for. Elizabeth Cady
Stanton was a radical visionary for her time, and the contemporary implications of
her ringing words in the Declaration of Sentiments still radically challenge us
today.
But, if we could truly dialogue across the centuries with Stanton, she would
counsel us not to despair. She would remind us that many of the grievances in the
Declaration have been alleviated, although not without much hard and long work.
She would look at us with either indulgent or frustrated curiosity if we asked her to
96. The dissenters focused on the Commerce Clause holding; see 529 U.S. at 668. Justice Breyer, in
a separate dissent, indicated that there was no need to have reached the Fourteenth Amendment issue,
and then argued that the Court's reasoning was flawed. Id. at 668. Thus, perhaps the dissenters might
well rule differently if they felt it necessary to squarely face the question of whether Congress could
legislate against state failure to protect against private violence.
97. See generally Fox, Re-Readings and Misreadings,supra note 21, at 75-76 (noting the Court's
cursory treatment of the anti-slavery foundation of the Reconstruction Amendments); Cheryl I. Harris,
The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson: The Death and Resurrection of Racial Formalism, in Doff. ed.,
Constitutional Law Stories 181 (2004) (demonstrating how Court majority ignored the history of
segregation and racial subordination to adopt a formalistic notion of equality that recast de jure
segregation as equal treatment).
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"choose sides" in contemporary feminist equality debates. Equal treatment or
special treatment; not being treated the same, or not having ones differences
recognized and supported? Formal equality that seeks only to eliminate overt
gender-based classifications, or anti-subordination conceptions? She might answer
"all of the above." But then she would go on to explain that these are the wrong
questions, that these are not polarities, but strategic policy choices in response to
particular forms that a deprivation of women's equal rights may take. And then she
would firmly remind us that one cannot diagnose a problem and propose a solution
for achieving full equality for women without reference to an underlying vision of
human rights and recognition of the obligation of government to secure and protect
those rights both equally and fully.9 If a practice, whether a public act of state
officials or a legal restriction or classification, or private actions such as violence,
or public indifference to private oppressions, impairs women's ability to enjoy all
their human rights both equally and fully, then the practice presents an equality
problem. She would remind us that achieving our vision of both equal and full
human rights for women will not come easily, without opposition, derision, and
constant hard work. We must not look simplistically only to what can be achieved
through the limited framework of litigation (although we must not give up on trying
to persuade the Court to revive the true historical meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause). As she declared in the Declaration of Sentiments, we must "use every
instrumentality within our power to effect our object. We shall employ agents,
circulate tracts, petition the State and national legislatures, and endeavor to enlist
the pulpit and the press in our behalf."99 I only hope that by doing so, delegates at a
Forum 2048, convening to celebrate the 2 0 0 th anniversary of the Seneca Falls
Declaration, will be able to say that "protection" has already successfully been
read back into the Fourteenth Amendment.

98. Inspired by the human rights vision of the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments, the 1998 Declaration
of Sentiments drafted by the Forum '98 delegates, myself included, explicitly invoked human rights
principles embodied in international documents. It proclaims that "women's rights [must] be defended
as human rights and that governments, private institutions, and communities be accountable for
promoting and upholding the human rights of all." FORUM 98, supranote 1,at 12.
99. THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN FEMINISM, supranote 4, at 88.

